

MARSHALLIANA
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COMEDY OF CONVOCATION
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THE

INFALLIBILITY OF THE POPE.

A Lecture.

"Tibi dabo claves regni cælorum."

BY THE AUTHOR OF

"The Oxford Undergraduate of Fifty Years Ago;" "Old Catholics at Cologne;" "Comedy of Convocation," &c.



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THIS LECTURE
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THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE POPE.

IDEALLY, what is Christianity?

Christianity means the union of man with the divinity, the soul, and the body of our Lord Jesus Christ. It means that man is in this life united to the intellect and the spirit of God. It means that man knows, as creature, whatever is true of God, in so far as it has been revealed by Himself; and that he knows this certainly, definitely, infallibly. It can mean nothing less; for if it does, then Christianity has failed in its object. If God has died upon a Cross to teach man truth, and man cannot know that truth, then Christianity is the greatest of failures. That God should be our Teacher, yet fail to teach; that He should annex salvation to the sovereign necessity of an integral and implicit faith; and that He should have died upon a Cross to accomplish both the revelation and its perfect acceptance by ourselves; and yet that we should be unable to know, for a certainty, what that revelation was and is—is the most patent incongruity and folly that the human mind can possibly conceive. If, by an angel, God had made His revelation, we should still have been bound to ascertain it; but it is God Himself Who has died to reveal to us what He is, and wills, and commands; and He has died to obtain for us

the boon of the most perfect union with Himself. That union is an intellectual union, because it is essentially a spiritual. It is a union of knowledge, quite as much as a union of love. The knowledge and the love go together; for without perfect knowledge there cannot be perfect love, since love is founded upon knowledge. Therefore, the moment you introduce the slightest doubt as to any one truth of revelation, you lessen the degree of love, and also its sure foundation. Take away the certainty of the Real Presence on our altars, and you take away the fulness of love. Take away the certainty of the doctrines of the Church, and you take away the fulness of faith; take away the certainty of the Church's authority, and you take away the fulness of obedience. Thus, love, faith, obedience, hang upon certainty; and the slightest doubt upon any one verity is the destruction of the spiritual life.

I linger upon this, because the perception of what is implied by Revelation is the perception of the infallibility of the Pope. The two go together. Let a man grasp the fact that God is God; that Christ our Lord is God; that Christ died upon a Cross to teach us truth; and that the fulness of our belief in that truth is necessary to our salvation; and then the idea of a fallible Church, a fallible Pontiff, a fallible code of doctrines, will be as utterly inconceivable by the human reason, as the idea that God Himself can believe or teach what is false.

And here I would urge just one simple fact in illustration of these obvious truisms. In this town of Sheffield—and what is true of Sheffield is true of every Protestant town—you have perpetual dissension and social strife on the subject of the Christian religion. You have preachers preaching against one religion, and preachers preaching against another. You have bitterness of spirit, and hostility of heart, promoted by "Christian" wrangling. Even while I speak, there are men hard at work taking their brothers' religion to pieces; and personal enmity is largely excited by these differences of Protestant opinion. Whether there be enmity or not, there is difference; and difference is it-

self in antagonism to the fact and the spirit of Christianity. God does not differ from Himself, and Christ does not differ from God; the Church does not differ from Christ, and we do not differ from the Church. We are one. In the Christian, that is supernatural, sense, we are one. The very existence of Protestantism, the mere fact that men can differ about the truths once revealed from Heaven, is proof positive in itself that either Christianity is human, or that Protestantism is the negation of Christianity. I want no other proof that a religion is not Christian than that it is capable of the slightest divergence. Show me that a man has a right to his opinions on any one dogma of the faith, and I give up Christianity as a human religion—unworthy the death of a God. If after four thousand years of leading up to the Christian dispensation; after the two thousand years of Judaism—that system of shadows and types; after God had been preparing this world for His Own Divine coming in the flesh, through centuries of prophets, and patriarchs, and kings, through ages of expectation and longing; I am to have nothing better than private opinion on every mystery of God's own Truth; then, I say, let me go back to Judaism, where men at least knew the law; let me live with prophets who were certainly inspired, or with Aaron, who was "called of God;" let me have the tribe of Levi, with its warranty of priests, and be sure that my sacrifices please God. I would rather be with Moses at the foot of Mount Sinai, or with Solomon in God's Temple on Zion, than with Christian bishops who cannot teach truth, or with Christian priests who deny it. Let me at least be certain that my religion is divine, because I know for certain what it is.

Protestants themselves feel the difficulty, and try to escape from it thus: they say, "We have the Scriptures, and they are divinely inspired."

No one doubts it. But the fact that the Scriptures are divinely inspired does not make them our only authority. You are wearied of the arguments, and you know them all

by heart, by which Private Interpretation is dispelled. You know the huge fallacy which attaches to the theory of the fallible interpretation of the infallible. The Bible is one thing; its interpretation is another; and opinion, opinion, opinion is a very poor substitute for truth. If the Bible is to take the place of the Church, instead of being simply its handmaid, the interpretation of the Bible must necessarily be infallible—infallible as the Bible itself. Whereas, see how opinion is championed against truth, to the total annihilation of reason.

Thus: Protestants are of opinion that their canon of the Scriptures is the one infallible canon; while they deny the infallibility of the Church, by which alone the canon was determined.—They are of opinion that every one must have a Bible in order to have a true faith; though they know that, before the invention of printing, the distribution of the Bible was impossible.—They are of opinion that our Lord willed Bible-reading to be our paramount source of instruction; though the references in the New Testament to the study of the Scriptures bear only on the Old Testament, not the New; nor is there any word that can be construed into the mandate that the Scriptures shall over-ride the Church.—They are of opinion that each student of the Bible is capable of interpreting it for himself; though St. Peter has told us that in the Epistles of St. Paul are things that are “hard to be understood, which the unlearned and the unstable wrest, as they do the other Scriptures, to their destruction.”—They are of opinion that their translation of the Scriptures is equivalent to the Scriptures themselves; though they know that translators and revisers, copyists, publishers, and printers have no warranty for their being infallible; and that the Bible was written in manuscript, and so copied, by Catholics alone, for upwards of thirteen hundred years.—They are of opinion that their interpretation of the Gospel imposes on them the personal obligation of dividing the whole of its teaching into necessary and non-necessary truths; though this is a hazardous, if not impious, assumption, utterly unjustified by any word in the Scriptures, and

subversive of the first principles of faith.—And, lastly, they are of opinion, each one for himself, that his own interpretation is the right one; though they see that the result of that fantastic hypothesis is a hopeless chaos of contradictions.

Now, if I wanted any proof, which should be simply mathematical, that the Bible is not our only teacher, I need not go to the Church to demand it, nor even to our Holy Father, the Pope. I have a proof so very near at hand, one that is so purely mathematical—if I may apply a school-word to an absurdity—that I have no need to ask Councils, nor Popes, nor any inspired authority. I ask only Anglican Bishops. I ask only Anglican teachers. I ask only the stoutest advocates of their own right to interpret the Bible. In this year, 1873, we have the most enlightened pastors of the Anglican Communion—that typical Communion of Protestantism—asserting that not only are the Scriptures insufficient to secure to us infallible truth, but that it is not necessary, any more than it is possible, to know what is infallible truth. I pass over Bishop Colenso, who has quoted eleven passages from the Scriptures, to prove that prayer ought *not* to be offered to the Second Person of the Trinity; and I take three Bishops, of three opposite schools, yet all men of deserved reputation.

First, the late Bishop of Oxford, Dr. Samuel Wilberforce, publicly declared to his clergy, that “the Church of England had always within itself persons of extreme divergencies of doctrine.” What was this but to say, that the Church of England, ever since she forsook the authority of the Catholic Church, and took up with the private interpretation of the Bible, had not only lost a positive belief, but the possibility of knowing what is truth? He does not say that the Church of England had *expelled* the heretics who held the “divergencies of doctrine,” but that, on the contrary, she had included, and nourished in her bosom, the teachers of almost every heresy.

Again, the Bishop of Ely, now successor to Dr. Samuel Wilberforce, in the old, Catholic, See of Winchester, has used

these remarkable words: "In all times, since the Reformation, the people have been allowed to hold *extreme* doctrines, on one side or the other;" not, you observe, mere differences of opinion on matters of practice or discipline, but "*extreme* doctrines"—that is, heresies—on almost every article of the Faith. This is tantamount to the assertion that, in the Church of England, "*extreme* doctrines" may be taken out of the Bible; and that therefore the Bible does *not* teach infallibly what is infallible truth. This is not the Catholic teaching; for the Catholic Church has most scrupulously guarded, and has hedged about with special anathemas, the infallible teaching of the Bible. The Council of Trent decreed that one God is the Author of all the Books, as well of the Old as of the New Testament. And the Catholic Church had treasured the Bible, through close upon fifteen centuries, before Protestantism was so much as heard of; so that to her alone are Protestants indebted that they possess any Bible at all. But I am speaking of the fallacy which attends the assertion that the Bible is our only teacher; and for this fallacy I am quoting to you authorities whom Protestants themselves respect. Thus, Dr. Tait, the present Archbishop of Canterbury, with a benevolence that would be apostolic, were it not heresiarchical, or ridiculous, says: "As to divergencies of opinion among the clergy, I do not wish to restrain or curb the liberty of the clergy." [We all know what His Grace means by "opinion."] So that he, the Primate of Anglicanism, admonishes his clergy to cherish Opinion, as the real spirit of the Christian Dispensation; confessing that, because truth is unattainable, fellowship in heresy is charity. It might be indecent to quote the Protestant newspapers, which make sport of the Anglican Bishops, their authority, or pretension to teach; not seeing that in doing so, they make sport of the Bible, whose expositors they take the Bishops to be. Yet it may be useful to select a few passages from popular organs of the Establishment—those organs which are read by the clergy, and which are welcomed in many English homes. Thus, the *Church Herald* discourses on "the intemperate and ignorant theo-

logical utterances" of Lord Arthur Hervey, Bishop of Bath and Wells; while the *Church Times* calls the Bishop of London "the tool of every clique of Bumbles in his diocese." "The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol," says the same journal, "has been maundering in his usual style;" and the *Church Herald*—which calls the Archbishop of Canterbury "the patriarch of the whole Anglican Communion"—says he is infected "with both Presbyterianism and Erastianism." "We find," says the *Church Review*, "violent, mild, ignorant, unctuous, and other varieties of Evangelicalism, flourishing in the Episcopal garden," ... "and also fine specimens of well-developed latitudinarianism." And, lastly, the *Church Times* thus epitomises the Episcopal virtues, and the authority of Bishops to teach: "Our Bishops, coquetting with apostates like Colenso and Vance Smith; acting as tools of the wicked Church Association, like Dr. Ellicott; coarsely bullying like Dr. Baring; talking wild nonsense like Dr. Fraser; conspiring with infidels and schismatics against the Church, like the two Primates; playing fast and loose, like Dr. Wilberforce; jobbing, like Dr. Jackson; ... unfaithful to their consecration vows; false to the doctrines of their Church; bullies to the weaker clergy; and toadies to the coarsest forms of irreligious public opinion——."

Thus, we have the Bishops declaring of themselves, that they have no more authority to teach than their parish clerks, their wives, or their children; and we find the recognized organs of the Establishment cordially acquiescing in the view. Well may the *Times*—the leading journal—exclaim: "All landmarks are gone. On the one side we find ourselves launched on an open polar sea of pure Rationalism; on the other side, we are urged, with all sails set, into the tropical ocean of Mediævalism." And the *Saturday Review*, giving cynical utterance to a conviction as firm but less hearty, says, "We are convinced that the continuance of the Church of England as an Established Church depends upon the permitted existence side by side, within her pale, of the three great parties into which her members are divided." In other words, the Church of England can only

exist by placing lies on a level with truth; and declaring before all the world that dogma and heresy are equally true—that is, equally contemptible, or false.

I have dwelt thus at length on the humanness of Protestantism, because I wished to make Protestantism *prove for us* the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope. Why go to councils, to saints, to historians, to prove what the Church of England proves for us—so very satisfactorily by itself? I need not dig up the archives of councils to prove that the Church is infallible—of its Head I will presently speak—when I have only to look to the Reformation to see whence Fallibility sprang. I need not disturb the saints in their rest, when I can appeal to the Protestant Bishops for the issues of *that* great apostasy. If I want to know whether the Church be infallible, I have only to study Fallibility. There I see that the Christian teacher declares truth and error the same; there I see that the Sacraments, the Real Presence on our altars, the authority of the Church, with obedience; the definitions of truth and their acceptance; the habit of confession and the powers of absolution, with the powers of consecration and ordination, are all debatable subjects, as the corn laws or a reform bill, or any purely natural theory. Positively, there is much less possibility of deciding the one, than there is of deciding the other. In matters of the world, even of sport and bagatelle, there are some rules, some authority, some laws; but in the Church of England there are none that are binding, save only, “Thou shall not be a Catholic.” Be anything else that you please; but obedience to the Vicar of Christ—that is the unpardonable sin.

I think, therefore, that when we recall what I have said at the beginning—touching the necessity of infallible authority as a sequence of infallible revelation—we have only to look at the Church of England to be experimentally convinced of the truism. If there had never been heresy, Catholics might have wondered what “a Christian” would become, when separated from the authority of the Church; but now that we are able to point to experience, and compare heresy

with the Catholic Church, we see that the authority of the Catholic Church is vindicated by Protestant error. What charm is there, what gift of divination, residing naturally in the Catholic Church, which should enable her to maintain undivided allegiance, while Protestantism can do no such thing? Why within her does every one agree—that is, on whatever is *de fide*—and why has she power to cast out of her the rebel, as a branch is lopped from the tree? But the other day, the “Old Catholics,” as they are called, raised their voices against Peter. Where are they now? Are they still in the Church? Does the Church, like the Bishop of Winchester, the Bishop of Ely, the Archbishop of Canterbury, include “extreme divergencies of doctrine?” In one moment, as though by lightning from Heaven, the “Old Catholics” were cut off from the Church, and nobody can possibly be mistaken as to whether they are “Catholics” or no. Thus the Church in practice is like the Church in theory—infallible, instant, unchanging—and even a child may detect which is the Church, because She alone commands and is obeyed.

I argue, then, that Protestantism is an indirect proof of the dogma of the infallibility of the Church; because, given a God, and given a revelation, and given its infallible truth, Protestantism is an exponent, *usque ad nauseam*, of the necessity of inerrancy to faith. We should have concluded, *à priori*, without the aid of Protestantism, that the Catholic Church is infallible; because the mere fact of a revelation implies it, because the honour of God demands it, because the knowledge of truth is bound up with it, because holiness and faith are inseparable. We should have admitted it, because to deny it is to deny a revelation—that is, the certainty of understanding it; it is to deny that our union with God implies first our knowledge of His Will; it is to deny that the work which was ended on Calvary was sufficient to ensure certain truth; it is to deny that the promises of God have been kept to the Christian Church; and to proclaim that the gates of hell have prevailed against her, that Christ is not with her all days even to the end of the world, and

that the Holy Ghost does not guide her into all truth. It is to say that faith means doubt, and Christian teaching opinion; that obedience can be rendered only to self, and that humility means indifference to truth; that the Sacraments are to be approached with misgiving, and that God may be, or may not be, on our altars; that, as a ship without a rudder, an army without a captain, a court without a judge, the Christian Church is a chaos of anomalies, most wild in the proportion of its vastness. Protestantism is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine of determined self-will; for it makes God to have died upon a Cross to achieve the greatest of results, and to have left us nothing more heavenly than—say, the poor Church of England.

But what is true of the Church is true of its Head; true by parity of reasoning. If the Church is infallible, so must be the Head, or else the lesser would be greater than the greater. The hypothesis of an infallible body without an infallible head is one that has never entered into the mind of the Church, nor been gravely received by its members. You may be aware that Jansenius, the founder of the sect which first openly opposed infallibility, had himself taught the doctrine which his disciples, the Gallicans, made it necessary to proclaim a dogma. "The Roman Pontiff," wrote Jansenius (A.D. 1617), "is the supreme judge of all religious controversies, whose judgment is right, true, and infallible, when he defines anything to the whole Church to be believed under anathema." And another heresiarch, of still more modern date—I allude to Dr. von Döllinger—has taught the very same doctrine. "It was acknowledged to be the prerogative," says this distinguished person, "of the first See in the Christian world, that the Bishop of Rome could be judged by no man. . . . It was a thing unheard of that the Head of the Church should be placed in judgment before his own subjects. . . . He who was not in communion with the Bishop of Rome, was not truly in the Catholic Church." And this reminds me of Henry VIII., who, in the book which he wrote against Luther, and for which he

was honoured by the Pope with the title, "Defensor Fidei"—a title still eccentrically borne by the crowned heads of the Church of this country—thus challenges Luther to point out the time when the infallibility of the Pope was invented:—"No enemy of the Pope," wrote Henry VIII., "can deny the submission which has been paid to him by the Christian world in all times and places. Now, if the Pope did not acquire this privilege by Divine right, let Luther point out where and how he became possessed of it. The origin of such power cannot be lost in obscurity, especially since it is within the reach of human memory." So wrote King Henry VIII. And, to pass to very different authorities, the consultors on dogma for the recent Vatican Council declared to Pius IX. that "the infallibility of the Pope was the perpetual tradition of the Universal Church." Suarez had written of the sixteenth century: "It is a Catholic truth, that the Sovereign Pontiff, defining *ex cathedrâ*—that is to say, proposing to the whole Church anything to be believed with Divine faith—is a rule of faith which cannot err. This is taught at the present time by all Catholic doctors, and I hold it to be certain, with the certainty of faith." Bossuet and Fénélon—whose very names are pledges of the chivalry of Christian learning—both declared of this doctrine that it was the key-stone of truth, the Church-long fact of our history. "All is subject to these keys," preached Bossuet; "all, my brethren, kings and nations, pastors and flocks; and," he adds, "all the Popes and all the holy fathers have taught it with a common consent." And Fénélon had written exactly the same thing: "I say with Bellarmine, that the thesis which teaches that the Pontiff can never define anything heretical to be believed by the whole Church is most certain, and must be maintained." Thus Fénélon and Bossuet—both subjects of a sovereign who brooked nothing against his own royal prerogatives—maintained, before the theologians of the world, the universality of this Christian dogma. And though learning may be conceded to the advocates of doubt, as to the universality, in all times, of this belief, it is enough to show that

the Christian Church has, on the whole, been imbued with the conviction. A not-yet-defined truth is open to controversy; for freedom is the glory of Catholics. Before a truth becomes dogma, it is the privilege—nay, the duty—of every Catholic theologian, to sift it to the very bottom of its foundations; and thus we see the brilliant clash of weapons, which, in the subtlest schools of theologians, has not unfrequently preceded definition. The Church is not a tongue-tying despotism, which refuses freedom to opinion; but, on the contrary, she concedes full liberty on every non-defined doctrine. The very spirit of freedom that precedes a dogma is her human guarantee of its surety. Authority steps in where controversy is ended, and when the cream of all opinions has been gathered. But not until the enemies and the friends of truth have said everything that they can possibly say, does the Church meet in council, and invoke the Holy Ghost, and pronounce *anathema sit*. Thus Catholics know when a truth is defined, that it is defined, not only because the Church has believed it, but because certain few disputants have questioned it. The definition of dogma is the voice of the Holy Ghost deciding between the Church and temptation; and when the devil has been driven to his last keenest shifts, he is exorcised utterly from opinion.

That the Council of Florence (A.D. 1439) should have taught that, “the Pope is the true Vicar of Christ, the Head of the whole Church, and the Father and Doctor of all Christians; for that to him, in the person of the blessed Peter, full power was delivered by our Lord Jesus Christ to feed, to rule, and to govern the Universal Church; as also is contained in the acts of the Œcumenical Councils, and in the sacred canons;”

(2.) that the Council of Lyons (A.D. 1274) should have pronounced that, “Controversies in matters of faith must finally be decided by the judgment of the Roman Pontiff;”

(3.) that the Eighth General Council (A.D. 869) should have subscribed these pregnant words—“Since, following in all things the Apostolic See, and observing in all things its constitution, we hope that we may be worthy to be in one

communion, which the Apostolic See supports, and in which is the complete and true solidity of the Christian religion. . . . We hold most blessed Pope Nicholas for the organ of the Holy Spirit, as also most holy Pope Adrian, his successor ;”

(4.) that the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) should have declared of Pope Leo : “ He is the one who was entrusted by the Saviour with the guardianship of the vine . . . the interpreter to all of the voice of the blessed Peter . . . the rock and ground of the Catholic Church, and the foundation of the right faith ;

(5.) and, lastly, that the Council of Ephesus, so early as A.D. 431, should have subscribed the following confession : “ It is doubtful to no one, but known to all ages, that the holy and most blessed Peter, Prince and Head of the Apostles, pillar of the Faith, and foundation of the Catholic Church, received from our Lord Jesus Christ, the Saviour and Redeemer of the human race, the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven ; and that the power of loosing and binding sins was given to him ; who, to this very time, and for ever, lives and exercises judgment in his successors ;”

—are facts enough to warrant our certainty that the Pope’s infallibility was ever held. We do not look that the Church, in its every voice, and in its every age, should be perpetually insisting on any one truth, as though that truth were subject to controversy ; it is enough that we find that, throughout the life-time of the Church, any truth has permeated her members. If from the first century of the Church to the nineteenth, we find a truth to be taken for granted ; all the acts of the Church built upon it, and all the teaching of the Church issuing from it ; if we find that the questioning of that truth has been associated with heresies that aimed at the dissolution of the Church ; and that bad kings and bad governments, worldly powers and worldly men, have invariably been its principal opponents ; we do not want to put our finger on some written word of every Catholic to the effect that he or she believed it. We assume that what councils have taught, and saints have approved, and his-

torians have registered, and heretics alone have questioned (heretics who were condemned by the Church), is necessarily the mind of the Church, her spirit, her permeating belief. We might quote St. Ignatius, St. Irenæus, St. Cyprian, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, St. Athanasius, St. Basil, of the second, third, and fourth centuries; St. Augustine, St. Leo, St. Epiphanius, St. Cyril, St. Chrysostom, of the fifth; St. Avitus, St. Isidore, Venerable Bede, St. Theodore, St. Odo, St. Edward the Confessor, of the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries; St. Bernard, and our St. Thomas of Canterbury, of the twelfth; and St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas, of the thirteenth; but if we quoted them all, and very many more like them, it would be less to show what they believed than what the fact of their belief implied.—Thus, could St. Irenæus have written, in the second century, “For with this Church” (the Church of Rome), “on account of its more powerful principality, it is necessary that every Church—that is, those who are on every side faithful—agree,” unless he was expressing the common conviction of both clergy and laity of that time? Could St. Cyprian have written, in the third century, “St. Peter’s chair is the root, and womb of the Church . . . the source of truth. . . . He who resisteth the Church, who abandons the chair of Peter, can he flatter himself that he is in the Church?” unless communion with the Pope was held by the faithful to be an integral note of Catholicity? Could St. Jerome have written, in the fourth century, “I, following no other leader but Christ, am joined in communion with your Blessedness, that is, with the Chair of Peter; I know that the Church is built upon *that* rock; whosoever shall eat lamb out of *that* house is profane; whosoever abides not in the ark of Noe shall perish in the deluge,” unless he was giving utterance to a popular conviction which none could gainsay or resist? Could St. Augustine have written, in the fifth century, “This is the rock which hell’s proud gates shall never conquer. . . . In the Chair of Peter Christ hath placed the doctrines of truth. . . . Roma locata est, causa finita est. . . . Those severed from the communion of the

Catholic Church—that is, not agreeing in all things with the Apostolic See—shall not have their names recited in the Sacred Mysteries,” unless the mind of the Church was thoroughly imbued with the conviction of such vigorous truth?

You will observe that these saints—all “Fathers” in the Church—lived in the time which is called by Protestants the pure, the primitive, the early. They were the mouth-pieces of the wisdom, the sanctity, the learning of the first five centuries of Christianity. We can quote the same language, as pronounced and anathematising, for every century of the Church, until we come to our martyr, St. Thomas of Canterbury, who asks, in the twelfth century: “Who doubts that the Roman Church is the head of all churches, and the source of the Catholic doctrine—*fontem Catholicæ doctrinæ*?” while, nearly at the same period, St. Bernard was writing these ardent words to Pope Eugenius: “Who art thou? A High-Priest. Thou art the Prince of the Apostles. In primacy an Abel, in government a Noe, in patriarchate an Abraham, in order a Melchisedeck, in dignity an Aaron, in authority a Moses, in jurisdiction a Samuel, in power a Peter, in unction a Christ. . . . Thou art he to whom the keys have been delivered; to whom the sheep have been entrusted. . . . Thou art the One Shepherd, not only of the sheep, but of all pastors. . . . All dangers and scandals emerging in the Kingdom of God, especially those which concern faith, must be referred to your apostolate; for I esteem it fitting that the injuries done to faith should be referred there in particular, where faith cannot err.”

And what said the Popes themselves of their prerogative; and how confirmed they their words by their acts? Even during the life-time of St. John the Evangelist, Pope Clement gave decision on the disputes of the Corinthians; and the record of this event is still preserved both in the Eastern and Western Churches. Again, in the second century, Pope Hyginus condemned the heresies of Marcion, besides those

of Valentinus and Cerdonius, without even calling a Council; nor did the heretics think of resisting him, nor did they appeal to any other tribunal. So, Pope Eleutherius against the Gnostics, and Pope Victor against Ebion, were exemplars of prerogative in this century.

In the third century, Pope Zephyrinus received back, in sackcloth, the penitent heretic Natalius; while also he condemned Montanus and Tertullian, Praxeas and Proclus, and others. And Pope Cornelius condemned Novatus and Novatian, nor dared any of these heretics to "appeal." Pope Dyonisius condemned Sabellius, and Pope Sylvester, Arius; and the condemnation was final and admitted.

In the fourth century, Pope Damasus condemned Apollinaris; and Pope Siricius condemned Jovinian; while Popes Innocent and Zosimus condemned the Pelagians—Pope Innocent, at the Council of Milevum (A.D. 417), using these words on the subject: "You have followed what you, as well as I, know to have been the practice of the faithful from the beginning. From these apostolical fountains perennial streams are pouring over all the provinces that thirst for the waters of truth. In matters of faith, especially, all the Bishops should emulate your example, and refer their doubts to no one but Peter, whose authority extends over all the churches of the world."

This, then, was "primitive Christianity!" We need not come down to the fifth or sixth century, because Protestants will have it that "Popery" was born about the time when it was four hundred years old!—And what said the kings and princes of the earth on this subject of "Papal Aggression?" They said this: the Emperor Constantine, the first Christian Emperor, called the decision of the Pope a "heavenly judgment;" and he left Rome to the Pope, not caring to live there, lest he should compromise the dignity of the See. So Gratian (A.D. 383) commanded his subjects to live in open communion with the visible Head of the Church; and he used these words to one who claimed, falsely, to be the lawful Bishop of Constantinople: "I am astonished at thy shamelessness in resisting the truth, since thou knowest

the teaching of Damasus." Thus, too, the Emperors Theodosius and Honorius are declared by historians to have been "Roman" in all that touched Christian politics. Yet they lived before Gregory the Great! Nor were the Eastern Emperors less jealous than the Western of the prerogative of the Bishop of Rome. Justinian wrote to His Holiness: "The unity of the Churches is based upon the doctrine and authority of your Apostolate:" and to the Patriarch Mennas he urged: "All must be referred to the Apostolic See; and the more especially because, where heresies have arisen, they have been extinguished by the sentence and judgment of that venerable See." Pepin and Charlemagne are names well known in connection with this chivalry of homage; and I will just mention that case of Henry VII. of France; who, when the Emperor Frederick solicited his assistance in the elevation of a pretender-pope, marvelled that the Emperor could speak so foolishly; for "did he not know that Christ had committed His whole flock to Peter; and were emperors and kings excepted in the Gospel, or did their Bishops not belong to the flock of Peter?"

It is true, too, that kings who had rebelled against Rome—witness a Frederick Barbarossa, a Henry VI. or a Henry II. of England—were moved to do penance for their crime, and to edify by public confession. And this brings me to England—of which just one word. To King Ethelbert, who sent an embassy to Rome, in profession of faith and obedience, there came (from Pope Boniface IV.) this supreme and resolute reply: "If any king succeeding, or any bishop, clergyman, or laic, shall essay to infringe the decrees of the Pope, he shall incur the anathema of Peter, and of all his successors." King Egbert, of Kent, and King Oswin, of Northumberland, referred the controversy on the paschal celebration to the final arbitrament of Rome. And we read of Kings Offa and Kenred, and Kings Ceadivalla and Knulph, making pilgrimages to the Vicar of God, that they might ask blessings for their Catholic subjects—in those far times of real Christianity. King Ethelwulf was illustrious for such homage; while his son, King Alfred the Great, begged the blessing of His

Holiness on the first plan for a College at Oxford. I cannot rest on this point, for it carries us through history, and to exhaust it would be to exhaust the church-element of almost the whole of Christian monarchy. I have quoted Henry VIII., before the time of his apostasy—before the time when inconstancy in marriage led him to create the Church of England. Let me conclude this branch of my subject, by quoting the Queen-mother of King Richard—Richard surnamed Cœur de Lion. She thus wrote to the Pontiff: “Did not the Lord confer plenitude of power on Peter, and on you through him? Blessed be the Lord, who gave such power to men, that no king, no emperor, no duke can withdraw himself from its jurisdiction. The Prince of the Apostles still governs in his See, and a judicial power is constituted in our midst. Draw, then, the sword of Peter. The Cross of Christ takes precedence of the imperial eagles, and the sword of Peter goes before that of Constantine. Has not God spoken to you in the person of Peter—‘Whatsoever thou shalt bind shall be bound?’”

And what have we to oppose to such teaching as this—the teaching of Popes and councils and saints, of kings and queens and nations—on the part of our Protestant objectors? There is really nothing more remarkable in the history of the Church, than the very few opportunities for even imputed fallibility that her checkered history presents. We might have expected that the Church, being always at war with the world, the flesh, and the devil, would have very frequently been trapped by the spirit of secularity, against which she was formed to protest. But, I repeat, how few are the opportunities for even imputed fallibility that her now very long history presents? Thus, Protestants will tell us of “bad Popes;” by which they mean Popes who were morally or conventionally disedifying. But, admitting for the sake of argument that there have been bad Popes, the fact would no more negative their infallibility than it would negative their mission or office. The Pope is infallible in faith and morals—by morals we mean the theo-

logy of morals—whenever he teaches as Pope; and the Divine illumination which he then receives is independent of his personal merits. It is evident that if infallibility, in faith and morals, depended on personal merits, then each Pope would be more or less infallible—to argue the point *ab absurdis*—just as St. Peter must have been proportionately infallible, in the degree of his growth in sanctity, or the Four Evangelists inspired historians, in the ratio of their immediate virtues. God, Who confers a prerogative, knows best how to guard that prerogative; and it is certain that He will not allow His promises to be broken by the humanness of any of His Popes. As a matter of fact, no Pope who has been reputed disedifying has ever decreed any dogma; whereas Pius IX., who is regarded by all men as the impersonation of the grandeur of human character, has been divinely fertile in pontifical dicta, and in messages to the Christian Church.

(2.) It has been objected, again, that, more than once in Church history, there have been two, or three, Popes at a time.

The answer is obvious: there have *never* been two, or three, Popes at a time. There have been false nominees to the office of the Poppedom, but never more than one true Pope. In times when Europe was Catholic, the privilege was conceded to certain temporal princes, to approve or disapprove an election. They made use of this privilege for temporal purposes; and a secular arm would sometimes be opposed to the spiritual interests of the Church. Now, before the introduction of railways and telegraphs, it might take months, even years, for the correct communication of a *fact*. Rome was a long way from Paris, from Moscow, from London: and if it were the interest of a power to keep a fact dark—a fact that interested the Church—that fact could be kept very dark indeed. In these days, a flash by the wire would enlighten the whole of Christendom; in those days posts and stage-coaches were luxuries unknown even to the rich. Mediæval transports, like mediæval manners, were not those of the nineteenth century; and we must throw ourselves back

into a totally different society before we can appreciate mediæval "false news."

But hear what the Council of Constance said—a council which was called expressly to decide between the Pope and papal pretenders. "A Pope, rightly and canonically elected, *cannot be bound by a council.*" Again, "It is impossible that such a See (the Roman) should determine, and hold, for the Catholic Faith that which is *not* the true faith." And Martin V., so soon as his authority was fully recognised by the council, issued a decree to the council in session, which contained the following words: "It is not lawful for any person to appeal from the Sovereign Pontiff, who is the Supreme Judge, and the Vicar of Christ on earth; or, by subterfuge, to elude his judgment in matters of faith." And this decree was instantly subscribed by all who sat in the council. Thus we have the distinction between true Popes and pretenders; and the very political difficulty, which forced on the council, issued in the rule of infallibility.

(3.) Next, it has been objected that the holy Bishop St. Cyprian resisted Pope Stephen on the question of the rebaptism of heretics; and that, therefore, St. Cyprian could not have acknowledged the personal infallibility of the Pope. Now, first, St. Augustine has written on this point: "I do not by any means regard the letters of Cyprian as canonical; but I rather judge them according to the canons; and what I find in them in accordance with the teaching of the Holy Scripture I receive with praise, and what does not so agree I, in peace with him, reject." Secondly, St. Cyprian was an ardent assertor of the rights and prerogatives of the Pope; speaking of him as "supreme judge," and "in the place of Christ;" declaring that "Rome cannot err," and that the Roman Church is the "root and womb of the Church;" and further adding these remarkable words—so pertinent to the schisms of our day—"All heresies and schisms have sprung from a disregard for the *one Priest and Judge*, to whom Christ has delegated His power. For if, in compliance with the intentions of our Lord, every member of the Christian community yielded a docile obedience to the representative of

God, the unity of the Church would never be rent." Thirdly, Pope Stephen had not defined any dogma, in regard of the re-baptism of heretics, but had issued a Pontifical command. Had there been question of resistance to Pontifical dogma, Pope Stephen would have excommunicated Bishop Cyprian; instead of which, as St. Augustine has testified, he remained in life-long peace with him. Fourthly, St. Augustine is of opinion that Cyprian recanted his disobedience before the close of his life; nor do I see how it is possible that he can have done otherwise, since his canonisation implies his compliance with the first law of the Church, which is obedience. And, lastly, St. Cyprian was a martyr; "receiving the crown of martyrdom"—to quote again the words of St. Augustine—"that, by the glory of his blood, he might dispel the mist occasioned by human weakness and passion. Cyprian sinned and expiated that sin with the blood of martyrdom."

(4.) It has been urged, too, that one of the Popes, Liberius, was reputed to be tainted with Arianism; and that, therefore, *he* at least was not infallible, nor can the links of infallibility be complete. The subject is too intricate to be gone into here: suffice it that Dr. Döllinger has written a fragment especially to exculpate Liberius; and his testimony should at least be accepted by the allies of "Old Catholics" in this country. When we add to this fact, that there are no writings whatever to show that Liberius taught Arianism; that it is certain he taught exactly the opposite; that the documents quoted by adversaries are interpolated, while some of them are certainly spurious; that it was Liberius who *resisted* the Arian bishops at the time of the Council of Rimini, and that it was for this very resistance that the Arian Emperor banished His Holiness from Rome; and, lastly, that Pope Siricius, in his letter to Himeric, speaks of Liberius as "blessed," while St. Ambrose declares him to be "a man of holy memory," and St. Basil styles him "most blessed;" I think we need not be uneasy on the question of Liberius, but may regard him as a victim of his own faithfulness to truth, in times of most bitter antagonism.

(5.) Fifthly, you all know the case of Honorius, a Pope also

supposed to have been a heretic. Now apart from the fact that Dr. Döllinger has told us, in his History of the Catholic Church, that this is historically untrue—asserting that Pope Honorius was *not* condemned for heresy, but for “inactivity” in not quickly suppressing it—I maintain that the records of the Sixth General Council, in their reference to the condemnation of Pope Honorius, are among the strongest proofs in the history of the Church of the Church’s belief in infallibility. For, passing over facts too numerous to mention—since I am tied by time in a lecture—I mention two points which are enough in themselves to set the matter for ever at rest. Pope Agatho, who presided in part over the sessions of the Sixth General Council—that council which condemned Pope Honorius—was himself the very firmest believer in the personal infallibility of Popes. These are his words: “The splendid light of the faith, transmitted successively from the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, by means of their successors, even to our humility, has been preserved pure and without spot; without *ever* having been obscured by heresy, or defiled by error.” And again, in a letter to the Emperor, he says: “The Lord and Saviour of all, the Author of our Faith, has promised that the Faith of Peter shall never fail, and commanded him to confirm his brethren. No one is ignorant that all the apostolic Pontiffs, our predecessors, have done this with confidence.” While elsewhere he affirms that the Roman See “hath never turned aside from the path of truth to any error whatsoever; whose authority, as of the Prince of all the Apostles, the whole Catholic Church at all times, and the universal councils, faithfully embracing, have in all respects followed.” So spake Pope Agatho, while judging Honorius, and while the council was judging him.

Next, this Sixth General Council, in its very last sitting, and after it had judged Honorius, subscribed these letters of Pope Agatho, from which I have just now quoted; using these words with regard to them: “Our eyes saw the ink and the paper; but our souls heard Peter speaking by the mouth of Agatho. . . . Therefore we leave what should be

done to *you*, as Prelate of the first See of the universal Church, standing on the firm rock of faith; having read through the tables of a true confession, sent by your paternal blessedness to our most religious Emperor; and which we recognize as Divinely written from the Supreme Head of the Apostles."

Thus we have an Œcumenical Council, while engaged in judging Honorius, and while actually condemning him for negligence, declaring that no single Pontiff had erred from the Catholic Faith; that the Roman Church had "never turned aside from the path of truth to any error whatsoever;" that it had "never been obscured by heresy, nor defiled by error;" and that "all the Apostolic Pontiffs had confirmed the brethren in the Faith." We have the infallibility of the Popes taught directly by that council, which condemned Pope Honorius for negligence. And, moreover, we have this attestation in the very last sitting of the council. Do we go too far in saying, that the very strongest case *against* infallibility is the very strongest evidence *for* it?

I have sometimes thought that God may have permitted the humanness of certain of His servants, in order to make more manifest the divinity of their function and office. And certainly, had there never been an Honorius, there would never have been the splendid attestation of infallibility overriding infirmity. Protestants may speak of bad Popes; but the Sixth General Council can tell them, that not even gross papal negligence can make a Pope teach that which is not true. Honorius was like—in his natural character—certain living Anglican prelates; who think that to smooth down heresy is the best way to hush up strife. Of course the heresy which Honorius did not crush—but which he had no voluntary part in fostering—namely, the Monothelite heresy, was so subtle as to escape detection by all save practised theologians; and though that heresy called for anathema, it is probable that only well-educated Catholics can tell to-day what it was. But the Pope is set over the Church, not only to guard what is true, but to utterly uproot

what is false. He is the trumpet that gives no uncertain sound, the champion of God's infinite honour. Not only to save *man* from error is the Pope divinely protected, but to take care that the Person of God be supremely worshipped by faith. There is this two-fold obligation on the Head of the Church, that he drive all error from man, and all insult of heresy from God. To do the one, he must necessarily do the other. God is more personally insulted by the assertion of any false doctrine, than by the practice of any immorality. To believe what is untrue of God is, in a way, to attack God's honour; and this is the reason why heresy takes precedence of all crimes that can be committed against God. If a man *does* what is wrong, he breaks the commandments; if he *believes* what is wrong, he breaks God. The expression is hyperbole; but if we read the writings of the Saints, and of all approved theologians, we see that they speak of heresy as a personal insult—a personal onslaught on God. The object of revelation, by the Incarnate Word—as was said at the beginning of this lecture—was to unite man's intellect to God, by a perfect apprehension of His truth, and, with it, by union of the will. So that the Second Incarnation, as it is sometimes called, by which man is made one with God, especially in Holy Communion, means, not only the union of the heart and soul, but the union of the intellect, with God. When man, therefore, has been made one with God by faith and by Holy Communion, he, as it were, shatters God's honour by believing a lie of God. I speak without any authority, as a mere layman in the Catholic Church; with no more knowledge of the Faith than such as is common to Catholics; but every Catholic knows what is heresy, because he knows what is truth. Every Catholic is, in a way, infallible, because he enjoys the infallibility of the Church. Every Catholic is, in a way, infallible, because he is one of the family of the Pope. The Emperor of Austria, or the Comte de Chambord, is precisely on a footing with the meanest ignoramus who possesses the Catholic Faith; because not by himself does he know, but by membership with the Catholic Church. The extremest humility, nay humiliation,

is the portion of every Catholic; because by himself he is utterly incompetent to define one dogma of the Faith. Pride is difficult for a Catholic, because he sins while he *knows* the truth; and for my part, I know nothing so humiliating as to have such transcendent faith, and yet to be able to sin. But, thank God, we are saved from heresy. There is the Light, the infallible Truth; and, if I fall, it is immense consolation—I have told no lie of God.

But for Protestants, whose Archbishop of Canterbury justifies “divergencies of opinion” in the pastors and teachers of souls, there is no such consolation as this. They may fall into sin, into wretchedness—so may Catholics—but they, have no Pontiff to tell them infallibly, both what to believe and to do. They may wish for confession, and they will find their Archbishop declaring that “the evil of confession ought not to be allowed to go on, for want of the attention of the bishops;” while the Bishop of Salisbury will assure them that “the practice of confession is unholy, illegal, and full of mischief;” and the Bishop of London will add his testimony that “the laity who habitually confess are at least as culpable as the clergy who hear habitual confession.” These are your teachers, O Protestants! You have no infallible Pontiff to decide for you, that the Sacrament of Penance is the appointed channel for the reconciliation of the soul with God; but “illegal” is the adjective which the Bishop of Salisbury opposes to the “infallible” of the Pope. Choose between the illegal and the infallible. For my part, I think that the adjective “illegal,” as applied to the salvation of souls, is the most sarcastic flaying of the humanness of Anglicanism that episcopal minds have achieved.

But there are High Churchmen, who protest that you must not obey your bishops, but only the Primitive Church. Yet, since the Primitive Church has been dead and buried for more than a thousand years, it is obvious that, in obeying the Primitive Church, you are obeying simply yourself. The same authority which taught the Primitive Church teaches the Church of to-day; and St. Jerome, St. Cyril, St. Ambrose did not recommend their penitents to transfer

their obedience to St. Ignatius, St. Polycarp, St. Irenæus. What would High Churchmen have done with Nestorians or Arians—with any one of the heretics of early centuries? They would have recommended them to appeal to defunct authority, as their living witness and arbiter! Still more primitive than Protestantism were the heresies that preceded—say the Council of Constance or of Florence; and they were met with the same infallible voice which meets the Protestantism of to-day. Archdeacon Denison appeals to the Primitive Church; and the end of it is that he, Archdeacon Denison, teaches himself, and the Church of England. He, the Archdeacon, does not see that he is his own only Church and teacher, and that every sect within the Anglican communion has the same right of appeal with himself. So of Dr. Pusey, Brother Ignatius, Mr. Bennett—their appeal is exclusively to themselves, under the synonym, “Primitive Church.” All that High Churchmen have done is to multiply the difficulties of the private interpretation of Scripture; for whereas the Bible-Christian can say, “I interpret for myself what we all know and acknowledge to be God’s infallible Word,” the High Churchman must say, “I interpret for myself the broken records of a thousand years ago, which were not inspired at all, and which have no claim whatever to my obedience.” Well might the late Count de Montalembert express this opinion of High Churchmen: “These men, I am convinced, will always prove the worst enemies of the Church, more so than infidels themselves.”

Again; there are High Churchmen who believe in the infallibility of certain general councils; and who urge that a general council *now* would be also binding or infallible. Well, that a general council of itself, and without the infallible Pontiff, is not God’s infallible teacher, is seen most clearly in this. It is impossible to say what *is* a general council. There is no direction given in the Bible as to how many bishops out of the Universal Church shall constitute a general council; nor what majority upon any definition shall be binding on the consciences of the faithful. At the Council of Nice, ninety-seven bishops were found to side

with that greatest of heresiarchs Arius. At the Council of Constantinople, as also at that of Ephesus, Macedonius or Nestorius could claim scores of bishops as patrons of their detestable heresies. Now what word is there in Scripture, what word is there in the Fathers, which determines the complement of a majority, or the representative force of a council? If general councils were God's only Voice, apart from the infallibility of the Popes, surely we should have had some distinct instruction as to what constituted a general council. "I will give unto thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven," was said to Peter, but not to a general council. It was not said even to the twelve apostles. "Thou art Peter" is one thing; "Thou art a general council" is another. Definition of a council must inevitably precede definitions of truth *by* a council; for, since infallible truth is at stake, let us have no question of the authority. It seems to me—though I speak under correction—that the difficulties in the way of an infallible council are far greater than the difficulties that beset the Papacy, as also the interpretation of the Scriptures. Thus the Council of Nice, when it decreed the Divinity of our Lord, in opposition to the heresy of Arius, obtained only a majority of 296. The Council of Constantinople, when it decreed the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, in opposition to the heresy of Macedonius, obtained only a majority of 111. The Council of Ephesus, when it decreed the dogma of "Theotokos," in opposition to the heresy of Nestorius, obtained only a majority of 129. Whereas, the Council of the Vatican, when it decreed the Personal Infallibility, in opposition to the heresy of Jansenius, obtained a majority of 600.

Now, were the majorities inspired or the minorities? And to what authority, I ask again, will you appeal, to determine what constitutes a majority? In the Council of the Vatican, which decreed the infallibility of the Pope, I meet with the very same difficulty that I met with in all the other councils; though here, happily, the majority was so immense, that the minority dwindled into nothing. Still, shall I say that those two bishops who voted "Non Placet"

—albeit they made their submission—were not the two divinely inspired ecclesiastics, who should have overridden the remaining six hundred? On the High Church theory, I cannot answer this question. I know not what constitutes a majority. On the Catholic theory, I can answer it at once: the Pope rules both council and majority.

Now supposing that out of the 600 Bishops who voted the infallibility of the Pope, 300 had voted against it? It would have been open to Greeks, to Nestorians, to Lutherans, and to the whole outside world of non-Catholicism, to object that the bishops who voted against it were really the organs of the Holy Spirit. For since the very majority itself in the Vatican Council was made the point of attack, so that every “inopportunist” was hailed with delight by every non-Catholic Christian, what would High Churchmen have said, supposing 300 bishops had been for infallibility, and the other 300 in opposition? Or, again, supposing *one* had been wanting to complete the half; and that one had made it necessary for the Pope to decide by his casting vote? You see the difficulty we are in. If you take from the Pope the power to decide what constitutes conciliar sufficiency, you put it out of the power of the Catholic Church ever to arrive at a definition at all.

That the Pope was personally infallible, in point of faith and morals, was the subject of discussion by the Council; and their duty was to decide upon the mind of the Church, in union with the mind of the Pontiff. They were not met together to overrule the Pope, but to speak for the edification of Christendom as to their knowledge of the mind of the Church. There was no question of declaring the Pope not infallible, in union with an Œcumenical Council, but of declaring whether the mind of the Church was in the direction of his separate infallibility. That the Pope was infallible with a general council no one had ever disputed; but there had sprung up a new school since the time of Jansenius which questioned his separate infallibility.

Now of course it would be anomalous that an external authority should decide on the infallibility of the Pope;

since, if the Pope is infallible, he can say it of himself, and he needs not that others say it of him. But the object of a council is not only to affirm, to deny, to question, but to bear witness to the mind of the Church, in time past and also time present. This was the duty of that Council. The 600 Bishops who sat in the Council bore witness—two alone excepted—to the Church's belief in the doctrine. The "inopportunist," without exception, did the same. Mgr. von Ketteler, the Archbishops of Paris and Rheims, the Archbishop of St. Louis, and the Bishop of Orleans, with indeed every one of the inopportunist, indignantly repudiated the imputation of Protestants that they denied the Pope's infallibility. They all used the language of Mgr. Haynald, who was supposed to be such a vigorous anti-infallibilist: "The dogma of Infallibility," he said, "had existed for centuries—nay, for quite a thousand years—before the Jesuit order was established. It had been known and adhered to from the beginning. It is neither the fault nor the merit of the Jesuits if the doctrine was dogmatically defined." And Mgr. Dupanloup had written, before the Council, in his work on the "Pontifical Sovereignty:" "This, then, is the Pope; the Successor of Peter; the Chief of Catholic Christendom; the Mouth of the Church—*os ecclesie*—always living and open to teach the Church; this is the centre of Christian faith and unity; the source of light and truth—*lux mundi*." There were no questions, then, of the Pope's infallibility: there was question of the fitness of time for defining it, or of the necessity of doing so at all. Nor was there ever a council, in the whole history of the Church, more numerous in point of representatives, more united in point of belief, more gloriously free in debate. Before the Council of Nice, there was terrible disorder among members of the Catholic Episcopate; before the Council of Trent there was much to be remedied in the discipline and spirituality of the clergy; but before the Council of the Vatican there was probably less of disorder, in either the theological or disciplinary sense, than there was before any other council. The whole Catholic world was

bound up in one Faith—save only where the poison of Modern Thought had secularized the tone of belief. That state of mind which preceded the Council, and which rendered the Council necessary, was the infallibilising of natural intelligence over the divine voice of Truth in the Church. There were men who exalted science—as they called mere human speculations—into the position of coadjutor with the Church, instead of that of simply its handmaid; and this error had to be met by the assertion of infallibility, residing only in the Vicar of God. If the world could but know it, the infallibility of the Pope is the safeguard, not only of Revelation, but also of the human intelligence. It is, first, the security for God reigning in the Church; and, next, for man knowing the truth. No dignity that the human intellect can attain to is equal to the dignity of being always secure as to the limits of Faith and of Reason. To be always certain that we know eternal truth, while human science is hedged round by divine, is at once the elevation of the spiritual man, and the glory and freedom of the natural. How strange that the dogma of infallibility should not have excited the world's aspirations, instead of exciting its passions! One would have thought that, whether the dogma were true or false, the mere hope of being rescued from the servitude of doubt, on whatever appertains to the soul, would have been so joyous, so bounding in delight, that the first thought would have been, "Would to God it may be true," not "Would to God it may be false." Why, even Voltaire could see the advantage of a Pope, from the social and the virtuous point of view. In his "*Essai sur l'Histoire Générale*," he confesses: "The interests of mankind demand a bridle by which princes may be restrained, and the people saved. This bridle might, by common consent, be placed in the hands of the Roman Pontiffs. Such a High-Priest, mingling in worldly conflicts only to silence them, admonishing alike the sovereign and his people of their duties, condemning their crimes, and visiting his excommunication on great wrongs, would be looked upon as the living representative and likeness of God upon earth." Such were the

words of Voltaire. But professing Christians are sometimes less rational than men who profess infidelity. The world is so enamoured, in this nineteenth century, of its own progress, civilization, and enlightenment, that rather will it abandon security, than the idolatry of human intelligence. Even the High Church clergy, who profess to seek truth, before themselves, their Church, or their controversies, were fired with indignation at the prospect of Individualism being superseded by infallible authority. This shows how they have lost sight of the mission of the Church, which is to rescue man from himself. They did not desire that the Universal Church should pronounce God's Vicar infallible, but rather that it should pronounce each one of themselves to have authority to disobey his Bishop. I am not judging men; I should be sorry to do so, for judgment belongs only to God; but I speak of that public attitude, which the fear of the decision of the Council generated in pulpits and on platforms. Both clergy and people, High Church and Low, desired first to be freed from infallibility, not to pray, and to yearn for, its truth. This is where the world shows its naked hostility to the spirit of the Christian religion; that it does not desire, before all things on earth, the certainty of God's one truth; but first its emancipation from God, not its emancipation from error. I think that, *à priori*, the very desire for the dogma was an indication of its probable truth; for that man should be desperate about knowing what is true is the healthiest sign of the soul. True or false, the dogma was the instinct, the pure passion, of the Christian soul; because, first, it guaranteed God's honour, and, next, it secured our Faith. When the whole Catholic Church met in the Basilica of the Vatican, represented by all Catholic Bishops, and invoked the Holy Ghost to inspire the Council as to the truth of the infallibility of its Pontiff, by that very act it sought the Wisdom of God, above all human reason and pride.

Thus we have considered, in detail, as far as a lecture would permit, a few of the grounds of infallibility; and we

have seen that there is much more to be said in its favour than can, even by enemies, be hazarded against it. We have seen that, Revelation being infallible, and God requiring us to receive it, the authority which interprets Revelation must be infallible as Revelation itself. We have seen that the private interpretation of Scripture fails in every requisite of authority; and that the whole mission of the Church, and the whole growth of the Christian, is shivered by that proud theory. We have seen, too, that High-Churchism—which aims at combining Catholicism and Protestantism together—is really more Protestant than Protestantism itself, because it doubles the contest with authority. “Go, teach all nations” was the commandment of God to the Apostles whom He appointed to succeed Him. “Go, let all nations teach *you*” is the Protestant interpretation of that text. Protestantism is the enthroning of each man’s self in the place of the Vicar of Christ, and the multiplication of infallibilities to the last man and woman that shall live on the Christian earth. It is the deification of opinion, as opposed to the exaltation of faith. It is the relegating humility, and obedience, and belief, to the sphere of unintelligent weaknesses; and the intellectual aggrandisement of pride and self-pleasing, in opposition to the unity of God. It is the most complete apostasy from Christian principles which the Christian world has yet known; for it aims at destroying the foundations of truth, not only its separate requirements. “Education,” says Professor Huxley, one of the cleverest expositors of modern thought, “is the instruction of the intellect in the law of nature; and, as to religious teaching,” he adds, “for the most part let it be of the silent sort, at the altar of the Unknown and Unknowable.” Unknowable! God the Unknowable! Then for what did Christ die? And why not go back to the days of the Roman emperors? or, better still, to those of the grand Greek philosophers, who at least were inflamed with the desire to know God, and passed their lives in the intellectual search? “To the Unknown God.” Rear an altar once more with that inscription under the dome of St. Paul’s Cathedral.

Let Anglican Bishops gather round that altar, and proclaim "extreme divergencies of doctrine." Let the Protestant people sing a hymn to their liberty—the liberty of not knowing truth. Then, when science has taken up the worship, and enlightenment contributed to the chaos, let the assembly confess that not to have a Pope is to be as a flock that is without its true shepherd. For my part, let me be in St. Peter's, at Rome, with the Bishops of the Catholic Church, God present on the altar, and all adoring with faith and with love. I know that in that Church God speaks with His Pontiff, and divinely illumines his mind. I know that in that Church the Vatican Council bore witness to the faith of all Catholics. I know that in that Church it was God, not man, who pronounced the magnificent dogma:—The Vicar of God is Infallible.

THE END.

